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"PRETENDS", LINGUISTICS, AND GAME-THEORY 
/A PARADIGM CASE OF GENERATING FICTION/ 
László Tarnay 
A. József University, Szeged 
0. Introductory Remarks 
It seems to be a common assumption among scholars that 
the verb "to pretend" plays a significant role in generating 
fiction. It has been equally taken up by such different ap-
proaches as the strict logical-linguistic analysis, the 
speech act theory, the possible world semantics and ontolog-
ical philosophy of literature."'' It has gradually become a 
common practice unduly to impose burdens on a single predi-
cate, while the fictional interpretation of the word went 
uncontested. So, the question whether there is any ambiguity 
hidden in its semantical representation has not been raised. 
On the forthcoming pages our concern will be to give an ana-
lysis of what such a representation may look like. This we 
do in two major stages: first, by drawing a detailed picture 
of the different uses of our word we touch on some problems 
of multiple interpretation and assert how fiction can be 
generated, and secondly we hint at a game-theoretical frame-
work in which oür previous assessments could be reformulated. 
But in order to clear the ground for our task we should make 
some preliminary statements. 
The basic difference between our approach and the 
attitude generally accepted is, as we see it, that the latter 
is towards giving some consistent system in which the claims 
of a descriptive study of fictional phenomena are met in 
order that the question how fictional interpretations are 
possible, rather than whence such a possibility may come. 
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may be properly answered. To accomplish this aim "pretends" 
is introduced into the analysis as a primitive term which 
is supposed eo ipso to account for the usual real/fictional 
ambiguity. Whereas our approach is focused on what "pre-
tends" means and on how it is used in different contexts; 
It turns out that it has a multiplicity of independent 
readings and an intricate web of presuppositions, so much 
so, that no onesided application of it in the field of lit-
erary semantics seems to be forthcoming. It follows then 
that "pretends" is by no means primitive but should be 
traced back to the concept of identity. A corollary of our 
approach to the semantics of "pretends" will be an argument 
on the need to distinguish two kinds of identity: metaphys-
2 
ical and epistemological. Evidence for this distinction 
will be extensively given on examining linguistic data for 
our term; yet, some independent clarification may be in 
order. We call methaphysical any identity (or concept what-
soever) that can be established on the basis of our lin-
guistic and logical capacity alone, whereas we call it 
epistemological if it is established on our assessment of 
what the world looks like and of what may contribute to con-
firming our knowledge of it. To see this distinction work we 
may give some examples where the two interpretations are 
conflicting: e.g. consider of there being some competing 
candidates who, say, have written a test; then uttering the 
sentence "I could be the winner" will be metaphysically or 
epistemologically biased depending on whether I am excluded 
from the class of the participants or form part of it. Or 
the sentence "I could be your father" is viewed differently 
if it is the product of pure fantasy or a topic introduced 
in court. To put it in a general way, the multiplicity of 
possible routes that events may have taken is a merit of our 
conceptual system in the first case, while, in the second it 
is the result of our trying to cope with how things really 
are, and hence it reflects our lack of knowledge. Although 
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this distinction is not one of possible worlds (for both 
seem to allow them), a difference in the assessment of i-
dentities is generated: a metaphysical identity is a kind of 
trans-world identity based on some logical-linguistic cri-
teria and hence calling for an answer to the problem of es-
sential and contingent attribution of predicates, whereas 
an epistemological identity is a kind of trans-world identity 
- if any - for which the much-debated essential/ contingent 
ambiguity may not arise, as we have seen in our second ex-
ample: having a certain father is usually esteemed to be an 
essential property, it can rationally be questioned in some 
circumstances without its having the least bearing on the 
identity of him for whom this property is predicated. An 
epistemological identity is then not only any continuity in 
time-and-space but as the second part of our definition 
above puts it, it is any assessment on sameness that may 
prove useful in understanding how things are. What are now 
the criteria of this latter identity? It is this question 
which a proper analysis of "pretends" must raise and try 
to answer. What may seriously hinder such an attempt is the 
fact that the meaning of "pretends" is contaminated by the 
interference of the two identities, so much so that a multi-
plicity of readings is generated. In order to entangle them 
we should embark on a systematic study of its possible 
occurances. 
1. An Attempt to Locate the Meaning of "Pretends" 
This part is devoted to giving a diagnostic treatment 
of the meaning of "pretends": it should reveal the basic 
problems in understanding the word and give some tenets for 
asserting the ambiguities in its interpretation. To prove 
our hypothesis we first have to clarify, what constraints 
seem to be imposed on the use of "pretends" in linguistics; 
whether they are valid should bear heavily on what inter-
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pretations are assigned to the given grammatical structure 
it happens to be embedded in. Two such constraints seem to 
be in the offing: one comes from Searle who says that "one 
cannot truly be said to have pretended to do something un-
less one intended to do it".3 "Pretends" then should "con-
tain the conception of intention built into it."4 The other 
goes back to G. Lakoff: it says that the use of this word 
always presupposes the truth of the negation of its sen-
tence-complement. Let us examine them briefly. 
The first constraint by Searle is stated in the prag-
matics of speech acts: it is part of the essential condi-
tion of "pretends". Yet, it seems to be dubious whether it 
can qualify as such in the form cited above. Consider the 
following short dialogue uttered in court: 
A: The accused pretends to be innocent. But he is guilty. 
B: He does not pretend to be innocent, for innocent he is. 
Both interlocutors can be rational in arguing for the 
particular positions they hold. If so, then the use of "pre-
tends" is supposed to be neutral as regards whether the 
accused has had any intention whatsoever. This boils down 
to the fact that a statement of the form: 
/1/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he has no inten-
tion of doing so. 
need not be paradoxical. One may be unaware of playing off 
a belief of being so-and-so. A proper example for /1/ can 
be somebody who is considered mad, although less sophisti-
cated cases would do as well. On the other hand, the use 
of "pretends" seems to affect what people believe about the 
person of whom it is predicated. Bearing this in mind we 
may try to replace /1/ by the stronger form: 
/2/ He pretends to be so-and-so although he cannot be said 
to be playing off a belief of being so-and-so 
which is indeed paradoxical. Now, we can formulate a more 
palatable condition on the illocutionary force of "pretends": 
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/C/ One cannot be truly said to have pretended to do some-
thing unless he can be said to be playing off a similar 
belief 
Instead of "playing off a belief" we might have said "making 
others believe accordingly" as well. The reason why there 
seems to be a difference between what the audience conceives 
to be like an illocutionary act and the per-
formance of such an act simpliciter, in our opinion, resides 
in the fact that "pretends" is not a performative verb. One 
cannot say: I hereby pretend... We can only describe an act 
of pretending, i.e. we can assign a similar force to utter-
ances which we esteem to convey such a force in advance. But 
then it loses its Sxplanatory power and is reduced to being 
a proxy for a previously accepted distinction. It is this 
fallacy that is often committed when "pretends" is claimed 
to account for fictional phenomena: it seems to state that 
fiction is what is intended as such whereas it should state 
rather that fiction is what is supposed to be intended as 
such. It will turn out later that to amend this character-
ization we should conceive fiction as a particular game in 
which players aim at an agreement other than in normal com-
munication. But for the time being we remain with the idea 
that there is a methodological difference between illocu-
tionary forces assigned on the basis of the performative 
character or on the lack of it. 
By blurring this distinction Searle is led to the con-
frontation of two different senses of "pretends": one being 
an intention to deceive, i.e. "to pretend to be or to do 
something that one is not doing", the other referring to a 
performance "which is ae if one were doing or being the 
thing" but this time without any intention to deceive.7 He 
claims that fiction can be predicated in the latter sense. 
Although his further analysis of the role of pretending in 
fiction involves the same fallacy we hinted at above: in 
order to assign the illocutionary force of pretending to 
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utterances one should not only presuppose the real/fictional 
ambiguity but be aware of how it is already distributed over 
the utterances, this postulation of different senses stands 
in need of an adequate justification. For, what could be the 
difference between the concept of deception and that of "as 
if"? For one thing, it cannot lie in the lack of intention 
because it would violate the essential condition of "pre-
tends" and we cannot speak of two different senses of the 
same word any more. If so, then the lack of intention to de-
ceive with "as if " cannot mean a lack of intention simpli-
citer. And indeed, Searle is ready with the answer: if we 
take "pretends" in this second sense, the speaker's inten-
tion is aimed at suspending the requirements that are to 
obtain when the speech act of assertion is performed. If I 
pretend to be Nixon in this sense, then I could only pretend 
to refer to Nixon as myself, i.e. reference is suspended. 
Searle's example here is misleading; for he mentions only 
fictional individuals as cases of suspended reference, while 
with existing individuals like London, Napoleon, Nixon,, etc. 
reference is claimed to be successful. This is again due to 
the hidden assessment about what can count as real/fictio-
nal before we embark on our analysis. But as we can see in 
the case of my pretending to be Nixon, reference to an 
existing individual can equally be suspended if the problem 
is formulated in this way. So, suspension is rather a gen-
eral criterion. In order for an utterance to be fictional a 
proper act of pretending of reference should be enhanced. 
But what happens if I state that I am Nixon so as be let 
into the White House? Does referring apply then? We might 
feel prone to answer in the affirmative provided that the 
deception was successful. But soon it is realized that such 
a use of "pretends" equally violates the essential and also 
the sincerity condition ui assertion in that the speaker does 
not believe in what has been uttered and that it does not rep-
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resent an actual state of affairs. Yet, it could be argued 
that the suspension of these conditions is not intended 
- although it is dubious whether someone could lie without 
the slightest intention of suspending being sincere! - but 
what is really intended is a succesfull reference. But what 
does it mean to refer successfully in this case? Does it 
mean that I refer to Nixon? Clearly not. For on the basis 
of a casual reference to the president I would never be ad-
mitted into the White House. Such an approach will then 
misplace any idea of rigid reference. Does it then mean 
that I refer to myself? Clearly not. For referring success-
fully to myself would again be inadequate for entering the 
building. It will misplace any idea of a speaker-oriented 
reference as well. So, if there is any reference intended 
in this case, it must be of a queer sort. Rather, it is 
the supposed identity of Nixon with myself that is intend-
ed in order to be let in. 
If we want to keep up the difference between the two 
senses of "pretends", we have to allow that there is an in-
tention to play off an identity belief in the first case • 
while it is lacking or suspended in the second. But is this 
so? If I state that I am Nixon on the stage, is there no, 
however vague, idea of a similar belief being played off? A 
negative answer would undoubtedly render stage-roles maining 
less. Of course, there is a sense in which no complete iden-
tification is possible, but no more can we speak of complete 
identification in the case of deception there is a clear 
sense in which I could not be one with Nixon however I striv 
ed. 
To sum up, the difference between the two uses of "pre-
tends" cannot be located in having some intention of playing 
off a belief, for in both senses there is a similar inten-
tion; it cannot be put into the kinds of belief that are be-
ing played off, for they equally involve identity. It must 
lie then in the belief-contents to be appropriated. If so, 
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then we must speak of different meanings of "pretends" but 
not of different senses. To account for the complexities of 
these belief-contents will be the task of the semantics of 
our term: ambiguities are generated as a result of different 
identity beliefs which are to be played off. 
The constraint that G. Lakoff seems to impose on."pre-
tends" apperantly belongs to its semantics. It is tantamount 
to saying that a sentence like 
/3/ John pretends to be a caesar 
seems to depend on another: 
/4/ John is not a caesar 
If we look upon the relation between /1/ and /2/ and 
state it to be presuppositional, we are drawn to the pecul-
iar character of this verb in that it cannot be tucked into 
any of Karttunen's three categories: I plugs, II epistemic 
verbs, III holes, for either it is a plug since it blocks 
the truth of its sentence complement or it is a hole since 
Q 
it filters the negation of the very same clause. To put it 
in another way, the role of "pretends" is then to express 
or rather to conjoin the contradiction of "x is an F" and 
"x is not an F" in a non-contradictory way. This idea is 
emphasized by the somewhat taunting 
*/5/ John pretends himself to be a caesar 
which can have the following logical form underlying: 
/6/ x pretends x is an F 
If we take further the unnegated complement of "pretend^' 
as the proper belief-content that is played off when an utter-
ance like /3/ is put forward, we immediately see why Sear-
le' s examples were misleading: he considered sentences 
which had the structure of /7/ rather than /6/: 
/7/ x pretends y is an F 
The asymmetry of /6/ and /7/ seems to have justified 
the difference between the two senses of "pretends". We have 
witnessed that a form like /6/ can equally well be used to 
generate fictional interpretation. There seems to be nothing 
- 381 -
in /6/ and /7/ that would call for one or another meaning 
(or sense). But then corresponding surface forms should 
inevitably be ambiguous, for apparently /6/ and /7/ are not 
the same. To bring their difference home we have to r ¡fine 
them to a considerable degree along the lines we have been 
arguing for the belief of identity. Then the relevant read-
ings of contexts with "pretends" will soon yield to analysis. 
2. The Ambiguities of "Pvetenda": Fundamental Caaeo 
An independant motivation for our claim can be given by in-
vestigating pronominalization in constructions like /3/ with 
respect to /5/ and /8/ on the basis of /6/ and /7/. A 
similar argument has already been given by Barbara H. Par-
9 
tee : the core of her argument is aimed at showing that 
surface forms like /3/ and /5/ go back to a stucture of /6/ 
while surface forms like /8/ go back to /7/: 
/8/ John pretends John to be a caesar 
/5/ resulted from the variable reading of pronouns whereas 
/8/ by a corresponding pronominalization of laziness should 
yield /9/: 
*/9/ John pretends him to be a caesar 
The acceptance of /9/ may be doubted, although similar con-
structions with "believes", "imagines", etc. are readily 
available. The reason why /9/ seems to be felt incorrect 
lies in the fact that there is a residual claim of identity 
in it, which is absent from contexts with e.g. "believes": 
/10/ John believes him to be a caesar 
where there is no relation whatsoever between John and the 
referent of "him". According to Partee there are some other 
examples which suffer from the same fault as /9/, i.e. 
which do not allow a corresponding laziness-reading; they 
are so-called psychological verbs like "feels good", in 
which a prohibition to substitute the same referring expres-
sion into independent variables can be motivated by the fact 
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that one is unable to have the same sensory feeling as 
another, and hence, to use an idea of Castañeda1^ one cannot 
feel self-identified except with himself. To account for a 
residual identity claim with respect to /9/ we now have to 
bring up evidence for /8/ and show therewith that this 
residual identity is different from self-identity that has a 
structure like /6/ and hence gives way to reflexivation. In 
this way we can reinstate the distinction between /6/ and 
/7/ by saying that they convey different identity claims. 
Let us consider constructions with "only" by means of which 
ambiguities like that of /6/ and /7/ are usually tested: 
/11/ Only John pretends himself to be a caesar 
/12/ Only John pretends John to be a caesar 
The meaning of /11/ is clear, but we may feel embarass-
ed by /12/. Yet, we would like to argue that we can think of 
a situation when /12/ is true while /11/ false. Consider a 
masquarade to which people are admitted only if they are 
disguised as one of the others /also present/ in order for 
him to be caricatured. If now, by some acid self-irony, 
John thinks of spoiling the party by making a mockery of 
himself, and if being a caesar is not a unique way of cari-
caturing, then /11/ says something about each individual's 
self-identity while /12/ is concerned with their supposed 
identity with John. The rule of equi-deletion would then 
delete "himself" in /11/ and pronominalization-of-laziness 
lead to /9/ in /12/. Such an idea can be made more blatant 
by paraphrazing our construction slightly: 
/13/ Is is a pretense for John for him to be a caesar but 
it is a reality for Jack 
/14/ It is a pretense for John to be a caesar but it is a 
reality for Jack 
/13/, which comes from constructions like /12/ and /9/, be-
comes a natural way to express the difference between Jack's 
and John's judgments about John's being a caesar; while in 
/14/ it is a difference between Jack's and John's claim for 
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the throne which is judged. In /14/, which involves each 
individual' s self—identity equi—deletion was obligatory. 
The correct semantical representations of /13/ and /14/ are 
respectively: 
/15/ It is a pretense for x for y to VP but it is a reality 
for z for y to VP 
/16/ It is a pretense for x for x to VP but it is a reality 
for z for z to VP 
/15/ and /16/ may be looked upon as the first result to 
amend the original /6/ and /7/. The use of identical vari-
ables in both conjuncts stand for our residual identity 
claim, while self-identity is safeguarded by the use of dis-
tinct variables in each. However, on closer inspection, they 
will turn out to be still inadequate to apply to cases put 
forward along the Searlian argument of "pretends". Take his 
first sense: /15/ may partly explicate what is happening 
when "I am Nixon" is uttered with the force of pretending; 
substituting "to be Nixon" for "to VP" we will have: 
/17/ It is pretense for x for y to be Nixon but it is reality 
for z for y to be Nixon 
If the variable "y" is used to bring home a residual 
claim of identity and if our argument about there being such 
an identity in any fictional representation in order for the 
idea of role to be realized is sound, then /17/ will equally 
represent the second sense of "pretends", and hence the 
difference has again been lost. The reason for this is that 
we have only tried to represent the two identity claims in 
two separate sentences and disregarded the possibility of con-
joining them into one. Yet, fiction seems to be the result 
of such a conjunction of identity beliefs: for, what is lack-
ing to disambiguate /17/ is the idea that in the case of 
deception the individual to be substituted into "z" takes his 
belief-content "for y to be Nixon" to convey a self-identity 
for him with respect to "y", while in the case of fictional 
representation he takes it to convey the residual identity 
claim but not the former, which can be duly said to be sus-
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pended. To account for this and similar amendments we have 
to formulate the corresponding semantic representations so 
that they make clear not only which of the two identities 
should figure in the relevant belief-contents that are being 
played off but - as we shall see - also to which the indi-
vidual who is playing them off is committed. 
But before laying down these representations we would 
like to produce some indépendant motivations for making our 
distinctions. 
3. A Pragmatical Paradox in a Semantical Vein 
Consider a case described in Johnson-Laird /1982/ after 
Bas C. van Fraassen:11 the king's son is thrown into prison 
and is forced to wear an iron mask. Although the king be-
lieves that the is dead, he should appear before him but he 
is looked upon as a common criminal. However, had the king's 
son endeavoured in -vain to be recognized by his father, the 
following problem may be easily raised: How can we sincerely 
report the effort of the son? We cannot say that he claimed 
simply to be the son of the king for his father believes 
him to be dead and naturally would not trust a common crim-
inal. Neither can he have claimed not to be a common crim-
inal because people in iron masks are generally considered 
to be criminals. And neither can he have claimed not to be 
a man in iron mask for no-one realizes that he is wearing a 
mask, and hence, it would amount to saying that he is not 
identical with himself, which is absurd. We think this the 
proper place to use "pretends"; what he can do is try to 
play off the least obtrusive belief about himself. As he 
cannot take off his mask or assert absurdities, we may re~ 
port his intention as 
/18/ The son of the king pretends that the man in the iron 
mask is not a common criminal 
The pecularity of /18/ is that identities are express-
ed via definite descriptions, yet the meaning of "pretends" 
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does not seem to have changed: the same multiplicity of 
interpretations can be correlated with the different con-
texts /18/ may occur in (e.g. release from prison, being 
locked up again, or mutual recognition) depending on how 
identities are taken to figure in the corresponding belief-
-content that is part of the meaning of an act of pretend-
ing. But we do not enlist these possibilities here since 
they flow easily from the various semantical representations 
{ we are going to define next. 
4. A Semantical Paradox in a Pragmatical Vein 
An independant motivation of distinguishing between 
different concepts of identity results from an investigation 
into the semantic principles of introducing definition or 
meaning postulates into one's language. Suppose we define 
"mad" as "having a wrong idea of oneself" which should be 
tantamount to an incorrect predicate-attribution. But what 
happens if we apply "mad" to its own definiens; for clearly, 
mad is a property and hence can be assigned to any individu-
al. Yet, if one incorrectly attributes "mad" to himself,- he 
is supposed to be mad by definition; then however, he can-
not have attributed it incorrectly to himself since he is 
already in possession of it. And if, in turn, he is right 
in attributing it to himself, he cannot be supposed to be 
mad again by definition. But then he should be attributing 
it incorrectly and a vicious circle is established.1^ 
To realize that semantic paradoxes inherent in any 
vocubulary run on parallel lines with our previous example 
where we can speak of a so-called deictic paradox, and that 
they are solved if the two concepts of identity are taken 
into consideration, we may re-formulate the present case by 
using "pretends"; we do not think that there is anything 
wrong with this, for, how else could we sincerely report 
one's serious misconception about himself than making use 
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of "pretends"? Not for example by "imagines" since to 
imagine oneself to be so-and-so has clearly nothing to do 
with what others should believe of him but in order for one 
to be considered as mad this latter condition is necessary. 
/19/ can then be a neat approximation: 
/19/ John pretends to be mad 
If the semantical representation of /19/ is taken to be 
similar to /6/, the vicious circle argument is introduced. 
Yet, if we apply, our ideas on identity, the paradox is 
dissolved: John not only believes himself to be mad but 
rather he self-identifies himself with someone who is mad. 
Then his madness results from a misconception of self-iden-
tity rather than an incorrect attribution of a predicate, 
although the latter is part and parcel of the former /see 
below/.13 
5. An Attempt to Formulate Ambiguities in the Traditional 
Framework 
On the basis of the aforegoing discussion we may try 
to re-assess the semantical importance of the different con-
texts "pretends" is allowed to occur in; the only problem 
arising from this claim is the lack of a proper transcript 
for the two kinds of identity. As a loose approximation we 
may try to express self-identity by a formula common in the 
epistemic logic of Hintikka to represent identification of 
referents: (x = a); while we may indicate by another formula 
(x = y) identity simpliciter. The meaning of "pretends" then 
results as ambiguous in six ways: 
/20/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and F/a// 
/21/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ 
and F/b// 
/22/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and F/y// 
/23/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b// 
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/24/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and F/a// 
/25/ /Ex//Ey/ x pretends //x = a/ and /a = b/ and F/b// 
Possible paraphrases of /20/-/25/ can be given as follows: 
/26/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies 
himself as a caesar 
/27/ John is considered mad because he self-identifies 
himself with no-one else but Napoleon who is a 
caesar 
/28/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that 
he is a caesar 
/29/ John is an actor: he tries to play off the belief that 
he is no-one else but.Napoleon who is a caesar 
/30/ John is being hypnotized: he behaves as if he were a 
caesar 
/31/ John is being nypnotized: he behaves as if he were no-
-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar 
Applayin "only" as a test, we see that the contexts 
which contain a self-identity claim do not give way to pro-
nominal ization-of- laziness : 
/32/ Only John is hypnotized in order for him to behave as 
if he were no-one else but Napoleon 
/33/ Only John is hypnotized in order for John to behave 
as if he were no-one else but Napoleon 
While /32/ is understandable as what makes a restric-
tion on who is to be hypnotized to behave as if he were Na-
poleon, /33/ amounts to the same, or else it is an obvious 
nonsense: for, there can by no means be anybody the hyp-
notizing of whom would result in somebody else's, say John's, 
behaviour as Napoleon. If there is self-identity involved, 
14 
then only a variable-reading of pronouns is possible. 
The tackle Fraassen's example, however, we have further 
to refine our formulation. For, there are cases (our case of 
being let into the White House included) in which to under-
stand the meaning of "pretends" we have to define not only 
what the corresponding belief-contents are but also what 
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the epistemic attitude of the audience is like. What we are 
implying here are examples like: 
/34/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he 
is a caesar 
/3 5/ John unaware arouses the suspicion in others that he 
is no-one else but Napoleon who is a caesar 
which can have the structures: 
/36/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a// and /Ez/ Bz//x=y/ 
and /x = a/ and F/a// ^ / x pretends F/a/// 
/37/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a// and /Ez/ B2//x=y/ 
and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b// 3 /x pretends//y=b/ 
and F/b/// 
Of course, our intuition about the acceptance of these 
formulas should be checked: it might be thought illicit to 
predicate "pretends" of somebody who would not be prone to 
admit that he has done so. Yet, we claim that we do use this 
word not only to highlight the difference between what one 
intends to make us believe he is doing and what he is really 
doing but to attribute a similar difference between what one 
is said to be trying to make us belive and what he is said 
to do. We can think of the whole history of madness and how 
"mad" is attributed: as we may put it, what we have pre-
viously explained as cases of being mad are the clinical 
cases whereas these new forms can be looked upon as the non-
clinical. Apart from any consideration of whether they are 
acceptable, an important conclusion should follow independ-
ently: the use of "pretends" is motivated by any difference 
in the epistemic attitude of the speaker (or the subject of 
the sentence) and the audience (jither with respect to how 
things are or how they (the speaker or the audience) are 
supposed to conceive of them. From this it results that the 
truth of the negation of the complement is only optional 
and hence the presupposition could easily be suspended pro-
vided a difference in the relevant epistemic attitudes makes 
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up for it. I may be truly said to pretend to be the president 
even if unbeknown to me I have already been elected for some 
time and try to be let in the White House if no-one around 
should happen to have learnt about my being president /La-
koff's presupposition cancelled/. But I may be equally said 
to pretend to be the president if by some foul deed unbe-
known to me I have already been deposed for some time and 
try to be let in if every-one around should happen to have 
learnt of my misfortune (Searle's condition cancelled). It 
can be seen then that no easy transcription of a proper 
semantical representation of some occurances of "pretends" 
is easily forthcoming. There are some serious demands on the 
contexts of its use which lead to a multiplicity of readings 
as to how the relationship between beliefs, iterated beliefs 
and reality should be construed. For instance, a possible 
reading of our original White House case is the following: 
/38/ /Ex//Ey// / — /x = y/ and — /x = a/ and x pre-
tends/A = y/ and /y = b/ and F/b/ 3 /Ez/ Bz//x = y/ 
and /x = a/ and /y = b/ and F/b/// 
To arrive at Searle's second sense of "as if", we 
should omit the second occurance of the formula /x = a/ 
from /38/, thus giving our last amendation to /23/. We 
shall not reproduce here all the amended versions as they 
can be calculated on the basis of /38/. We give, however, 
a formula for the paradoxical case of B. van Fraassen to 
show the neat resemblances between the semantical reasons 
of "pretends" and its pragmatical motivations, both of which 
should be as proper contextual extension of its occurrence. 
For the sake of simplicity, assume that the son of the king 
is John while the man in the iron mask is called Jack. Then 
the interpretations of /x = y/ and /x = a/ and /y = b/ are 
forthcoming if John = a and Jack = b. Indicate the corre-
sponding predicates by capital M/ask/, S/on/ and C/riminal/. 
Disregarding here the inner structure of definite descrip-
tion as irrelevant to the point we are making, we arrive at 
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the following formula; 
/39/ /Ex////M/x/ and /x = a/ and S/a// and /Ey// —/x=y/ and 
/C/y/// ^ /x pretends///y = b/ and M/b/ 3 C/b// => 
/Ez/ Bz///x = b/ and M/b// 3 — C/b///// 
The complexity of /39/ is due to the surplus difference 
of belief contexts and reality. It is entirely different 
from either of the previous forms, and this is as it should 
be; for, John cannot be taken as a fool or an actor since 
the audience have no idea of his being a son of the king or 
or his being disguised. Yet, John's supposed act is an act of 
pretending because he intends the audience to take a rea-
soned step from what he knows to be an acting in disguise to 
a purported fact about his self-identity with the person be-
hind the mask. It is as if from one's playing a part on the 
stage, there were something to be inferred about his identity 
outside the stage. No wonder then that the effort of the 
king's son fails. This is a step which requires thinking in 
the metalanguage. A premature conclusion might be that from 
something fictional no judgement on how things are in real-
ity can follow. 
A final comment on the formulae conceived in the tradi-
tional framework should still be made. It might be suggested 
that they are based on scope distinctions, so much so, that 
"pretends" appears to be functioning as an operator. If so, 
we must have committed the very fallacy we wanted to avoid: 
the assumption that it is primitive. This idea, however, 
would be based on the fact that our formulae are sound; yet 
they suffer from a serious drawback: the different identity 
claims they seem to raise can in no sense be said to be pre-
tended by the speaker (or the subject of the sentence). What 
then can be the reason for their being embedded in its 
scope? In accordance with what we have said about the general 
character of its illocutionary force, a reason may be put 
forward in the form of an assumption like the abstract per-
formative hypothesis. It would entail there still being a 
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unique sense in which the semantics of "pretends" can con-
tribute to the analysis of the sentences. Ambiguities could 
not arise; for, in how many senses can I perform an act of 
asking or threatening or boasting, etc? Apparently in one, 
otherwise the concept of illocutionary force itself would be 
ambiguous, and we would have to introduce some other hypoth-
esis or an element playing the part of disambiguation. Yet, 
we have seen that already Searle accepted at least two dif-
ferent senses of "pretends" and we argued that the difference 
between them can only be accommodated as a difference in 
meaning. If identities are a semantical fact, then where does 
our knowledge of fiction come from when we are present at a per-
formance on the stage? A pragmatically-biased answer would 
run as saying that it is not the meaning but the use of sen-
tences: how language is used - that yields this information. 
So far so good. But this pragmatical fact cuts deeper into 
the meaning of terms: not in that it assigns referents to 
them but in that it gives criteria for establishing new 
identities between individuals, and this is already a se-
mantical result. To describe what is at work here theoreti-
cians introduced possible world models which generated the 
same problem as is at stake here: how can identities across 
worlds be constructed? And so, the problem was given purely 
semantical twist. Our approach ventures to pass in between: 
identities are a result of strategical moves of the partici-
pants in a language game; in that they are yielded by moves, 
they are semantical facts, but in that the corresponding 
moves are made in a language game the playing of which is 
motivated by some pragmatical fact outside the game, they 
are pragmatically related. On starting to play a game play-
ers have to decide how to interpret individual terms; but 
why they interpret them as they do cannot be justified with-
in the game. A major merit of such an approach is that it 
enables players to pass from one game to another almost in-
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perceptibly by reinterpreting their terms. Such a possibil-
ity may be indicated by a game rule correlated to the use 
of "pretends". Another advantage of the strategical charac-
terization of identities is that it explains away the dif-
ference between what we called epistemological and meta-
physical modalities. The use of identical terms or terms 
which stand for identical variables in two different lan-
guage games can only be metaphysically grounded: residual 
claims of identity always refer to such possibilities: they 
relate two different variables from different worlds under 
some description like "x playing the part of y" that might 
or might not equal alternativeness in a possible world 
theory (see below). Self-identities, on the other hand, are 
a restriction on using the same variable all through a given 
a language game. As such they express epistemological atti-
tudes with respect to a world. The two Searlian senses of 
"pretends" can be thought of as initiating different language 
games. When formulating the meaning of "pretends" it is not 
enough to say that an act was performed but we have to lay 
down what game the players seem to be starting on; the 
proper criteria, however, cannot be given within the terms 
of the game, as an actor cannot say to the audience that he 
is acting. They abide by the rules, the acceptence of which 
is a contingent fact on the part of the players. 
A strange but well-founded conclusion to the discussion 
above c^n be added to the effect that, since "pretends" is 
considered a game-initiator rule and it is up to the players 
to start playing or not, there are no truth-conditions to be 
correlated with the use of "pretends". For I may at any time 
turn my back on the stage or take an utterance as part of a 
similar move at face value, i.e. as a move in the original 
game. It follows rightly from-the fact that no act of pre-
tending can be explicitly performed, rather such acts are so 
described. Hence, this is our solution to the problem of 
assigning a force of pretending to an utterance in a non-
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explanatory manner. 
6 . A Further Evidence of the New Identity Claim 
Indépendant evidence for the need to explain identities 
can be recovered from the classical problem of systematic 
ambiguity of predication. To put it clearly, we may recur to 
an example by Reichenbach: scarfs can be used either as 
turbans or as slings. However, objects individuated as tur-
bans cannot be identical with objects individuated as slings, 
unless the property "scarf" is predicated of both of them. 
But then, we create systematic ambiguity by assigning to a 
predicate "turban" an argument, the value of' which could be 
either objects originally made as turbans or objects origi-
nally made to be scarfs but eventually used as turbans. In 
the latter case, to avoid ambiguity, the function "being 
scarf" can be introduced as an argument of a higher type. 
To apply our device to the case, consider the following 
example: 
/40/ Mary was wearing a turban but she unfurled it for Pe-
ter to wear it round his neck 
/40/ enables us to re-formulate our ideas in terms of pro-
nouns; how should "it" be interpreted? To take it to be 
bound by some antecedent like "a turban" and "a sling" will 
lead to the absurdity that the two occurances of "it" do 
not refer to the same individual. /40/ then expresses a 
nonsense situation by conjoining two entirely different 
clauses. But we can equally take "it" to stand for that 
common aspect (being a scarf) under which turbans and slings 
are associated: it then expresses some residual claim of 
identity between some object which is a turban or a sling 
and one which is a scarf. Putting it in the traditional way 
we can represent the core of /40/ as: 
/41/ /z//Ex//Ew////x = z/ and G/x/ and W/w,x/ and 
UF/w,x// ^ /Ey//Ev///y = z/ and — T/y/ and S/y/ and 
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W/v,y/// 
where the capitals T/urban/, U/n/F/urls/, S/ling/, and 
W/ears/ stand for the corresponding predicates and the vari-
ables z, x, and y range over objects of which "scarf", "tur-
ban" and "sling" can be predicated respectively. 
Examples like /40/ testify that identities of variables 
may in the last resort be epistemologically based and hence 
be part of the same language game. So, we should revise our 
ideas on this. To accomplish this aim we should consider a 
related example. 
7. Fiction VB "Pretende" 
On the basis of our argument about /40/ we may feel 
entitled to substitute "pretends" for "was" in it; 
/42/ Mary pretended to be wearing a turban but she unfurled 
it for Peter to wear it round his neck 
Yet, /42/ is different from /40/ as can be seen from a 
closer scrutiny of the structure of the first clause. It 
duly gives way to the presupposition that results from ne-
gating the complement of "pretends"; but because of the • 
scope ambiguity of negation there are three distinct out-
comes: 
/43/ — /Ex///x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x// 
/44/ /Ex///x is a turban/ and — /Mary is wearing x// 
/45/ /Ex// — /x is a turban/ and /Mary is wearing x// 
/43/ is clearly unacceptable for it makes pronominalization 
impossible in the next clause; /44/ is unacceptable for the 
same reason; so, there remains /45/. It says that there is 
nothing as a turban: there is no object is which is a turban; 
while /40/ asserted that there was something as a turban only 
it was unfurled. Formulating the core of /42/ alongside with 
/41/ we have: 
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/4 6/ /Ex//Ey//Ew//Ev/// w pretends //x = y/ and T/x/ 
and W/w,x// and UF/w,y// 3 /S/y/ and W/v,y/// 
By /46/ we have returned to our original /x = y/ for-
mula, which indicates that there is an optional move to ini-
tiate a new game. Since it is optional, it may or may not be 
respected in the next moves. If it is, then what follows the 
complement of "pretends" will pertain to fiction and /46/ 
has to be re-written accordingly. If it is not, then /46/ 
applies, i.e. "pretends" is only used as a garden variety of 
one of its presuppositions, this time /45/ to secure pro-
nominalization. This kind of use of "pretends" is quite 
common in forms like "He pretended to be happy" for "He was 
not happy" or rather for "He tried to be happy", "They pre-
tended to have built a nice house" for "They built an ugly 
house", etc. This use of "pretends" is parasitic on negation: 
in our example, it turns on whether or not what Mary was 
wearing can be considered to be a turban; it is a purely 
epistemologically-biased question. Hence, the only thing 
that counts is that the presupposition-filtering be such 
that it allow further play, this time pronominalization. To 
secure it, the use of /42/ should intend some function like 
"x consists of y", "x is a long strip of cloth" or simply 
"x is a scarf". These functions are means of ensuring play 
in the original game: they are based on the epistemology of 
the situation in which the sentence is uttered. They are 
what associate /42/ with /40/; yet, it is important to keep 
in mind that sentences like /42/ are parasitic on negation, 
for, it is this fact which the other use of "pretends" takes 
advantage of. It initiates a new game which in some sense 
conjoins /40/ and /42/: as /42/ is parasitic on negation 
this new use is grounded in the fact that something is not 
is it is perceived or known of. But is does not aim at en-
hancing this default in our epistemology as we indicated 
above, for then it would mean continuing the original game; 
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but it tries, so-to-say, to perpetuate this default by 
simply taking it for granted and hence assembling /42/ to-
gether with /40/ but from the standpoint of a new game; 
note that if it were the original game to be played, it 
would amount to cancelling the awareness of an error and to 
perpetuating a misplaced awareness of its opposite. Players 
who miss this game-initiating use of "pretends" simply fall 
into the state of illusion or deceit. But by enhancing the 
principles of a new game the meaning of /42/ is raised in 
the form of /40/ onto a higher metaphysical level. Normal 
language games are epistemological games: they are played so 
as to further the knowledge of the participants. Games ini-
tiated by "pretends" are metaphysical games: they are played 
so as to give the participants some hindsight about how 
things could have been. This is the reason why "pretends" is 
not performative, why /40/ can equally be taken as a move in 
a game initiated by "pretends": what is sure is that some or 
all proper parts (let alone "presuppositions") are parasitic 
on negation. "Pretends", then, cannot be made part of some 
particular sentence structure for it could be part of any. 
But it cannot have an illocutionary force simpliciter for it 
entails semantical principles of playing a new game, which 
we examined at some length in the previous parts of this 
paper. 
With this we round off our analysis of the use of "pre-
tends". In the remaining pages we put forward a constructive 
proposal for the treatment of this peculiar verb within some 
game-theoretical framework. For lack of space we can only 
hint at the basic outlines of a similar theory that could 
accomodate most of the problems we have come across during 
our analysis. The two major pillars on which the present 
approach to "pretends" rests and which, though they have 
been treated separately, should be integrated in a natural 
way, are what we called the Searlian condition on "pretends" 
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and its presupposition matrix proposed by G. Lakoff. Armed 
with these tools we are ready to set out on a more elabo-
rate proposal. 
8. "Pretends" in Game-Theory 
We have already adumbrated in a concise form the prob-
lem which a game-theoretical analysis of "pretends" should 
resolve. As it has to be a kind of linguistic theory based 
on game-theoretical principles, we have to cast a glance at 
what results have already been achieved in the field. A by 
now rather extensive body of works deals with the possibil-
ity of introducing game-theory into questions of semantics: 
there are game-theoretical semantics elaborated by J. Hin-
tikka and some of his followers. The basic aim of such a 
theoretical approach is to give an algorithm for the evalua-
tion of infinitely long sentences by reducing them to their 
atomic constituents; this it does by correlating semantical 
games with each such sentence with the definition of proper 
rules to govern the moves of the two players, Nature and 
Myself. These verificational games however, may have no rele-
vance to the analysis of "pretends" if the latter has no 
truth-conditions, and hence cannot be given a truth-value. 
Having a truth-value is not a linguistic fact, however, so 
it may not be a major default if the semantics of some sen-
tences need to be played off by some other criterion coming 
from outside its linguistic context. And, correspondingly, 
there is another recent approach to linguistics on the basis 
of game-theory, which provides a similar possibility. It is 
elaborated in the book of L. Carlson on dialogue games. He 
departs from the idea of semantical games in that the aim of ' 
playing dialogues cannot be the evaluation of sentences but 
rather the realization of some specific agreement with 
respect to them. Of course, ordinary dialogues should be 
levelled at putting forth true sentences, for players do 
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want to have a common idea about how things are in reality. 
Biased by the idea of truth Carlson can without much diffi-
culty accommodate the semantical game rules in his dialogue 
game theory. To secure adherence to truth each player's con-
tribution to a game is viewed as an effort to approach 
Nature's position, whose moves can without further ado be 
introduced into the playing of any game. Dialogue games are 
then played in order to know, and hence they are epistemolo-
gical.15 
If we want to define what new game "pretends" may ini-
tiate, the first principle to be substituted is that of 
truth. What can be the aim of the players if agreement with 
truth is taken away? It might be answered: entertainment. 
But it is not a constitutive principle; it is not an aim 
within the game, rather an outside motivation, and as such, 
it could refer to any kind of play in general. Neither would 
passing the time or similar solutions be a better candidate. 
Anyway, on closer inspection it turns out that there is 
nothing that could coherently replace truth as a principle. 
Hence, what we would like to propose is that the aim of play-
ing a game of fiction is agreement of the players simpliciter 
on some particular metaphysical possibility of how things 
could be arranged. It is important to see that this attempt-
ed arrangement can equally violate physical or even logical 
laws that govern ordinary dialogue games. Yet this arrange-
ment is not something to be guessed; it should be based on 
the actual moves the players make in the game. If there is 
an author or performer, his moves are to be accommodated 
within the game just as those of Nature have been in ordi-
nary dialogue games. It is his position, then to which the 
agreement of the participants is duly recalled. Any dialogue 
that takes up a passage from a text by such an author should 
be viewed correspondingly. Take the following example: 
/47/ Who killed Roberta? 
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On the basis of Carlson's argument on representing 
dialogues by means of game-trees, a natural interpretation 
of /47/ can be given below. The neccessary assumptions for 
doing this flow directly from the dialogue game rules Carl-
son formulated. To wit, to put forward /47/ one should pre-
sume an, even implicit, previous move that somebody killed 
Roberta. This (these) previous move(s) should play down the 
fact that a new game different from that of seeking the 
truth is at stake here; for, how else would players know 
what game a move by /47/ is part of? This pre-condition of 
game-playing can be made common by the use of "pretends", 
yet, there are other forms to recall attantion to it, e.g. 
"I have read it somewhere...", "He told us the story of his 
latest novel", etc. But as it is simply a means of giving 
intention that one is playing a game, to say it out loud is 
not a neccessary condition of playing: I may turn to some-
body with the boldest intention of asking /47/ and he may or 
may not understand my aim when aswering; moreover, he may 
even misunderstand my aim, and rack his memory about some 
actual Roberta who has been killed. And he need not be un-
successfull in his effort. Can we say then that we are play-
ing a game? We think not. Yet, our utterances affect moves, 
only moves within two entirely different games. Then common 
understanding can be reached only by explaining explicitly 
what separate game each of us is playing. Asking /4 7/ then 
- just like the utterance of any sentence in general - ne-
cessitates that one's aim in putting forth that particular 
move the given utterance instantiates be divulgated. This 
requirement is no more for instance than the knowledge that 
we are playing bridge and not poker. An utterance can easily 
count as a move in two different games. If so, then players 
should be reminded of what game they are playing or else 
their moves cannot be accommodated within the same game. 
Albeit as we think it justified that the new game that 
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"pretends" might initiate should be defined as a separate 
game on the idea that the players are furthering a differ-
ent aim, we can turn to the game-tree of /47/. We cannot 
give, however, a complete representation of it as it "ould 
involve all possible answers - which may easily be infinite, 





A asks B: 
Who killed 
Roberta? 
Who killed Roberta? 
Clyde killed Roberta? 
A asks B: Who killed Roberta? 
B answers A: Clyde killed Roberta? 
In drawing the figure of /48/ we did not deviate from 
Carlson's method of analysing dialogues, only the middle 
branch is to be interpreted as the silent moves of the 
author, this time T. Dreiser, whose position is the ideal 
which the other players, A and B. would like to share. This 
amendment, however, carries some other explanatory power: 
contrary to Nature, the Author may be directly addressed, 
and hence his moves may not neccessarily remain silent. 
This further means that he may participate not only in a 
1 6 
tultively correct answer to the question. 
/48/ Who killed Roberta? Who killed Roberta? 
j Clyde killed Rober-
ta 
Who killed Roberta? Who killed Roberta? 
A asks B: Who killed Ro- Clyde killed Rober-
berta? ta? 
A asks B: Who kill-
ed Roberta? 
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dialogue gaige about some book of his but he may even be 
questioned about some hitherto unwritten story of his. That 
is, he may put forward any fictional story he likes. On the 
other hand, if a story, whose author is already dead or is 
simply unknown is at stake, his moves are doomed to be si-
lent. This means nothing more than tha t, the Author is at 
once the authority of the corresponding game. 
Another justification of such an interpretation of the 
Author is given alongside our proof about fiction as meta-
physical possibility. For, what else can one's inquiry into 
the way things may have turned out mean than authorizing one-
self to accupy the position of Nature in a corresponding 
game? This is the way fictional interpretations of sentences 
can most differ from the original. If we are contemplating 
by all means in our power some epistemic possibility - which 
we would tend to call probability - we are trying to remain 
within the boundaries of the same game, i.e. we are doing 
our best to confine ourselves to what the moves of Nature 
are. To use our initial example: if one has undergone an 
exam, one ponders whether he is accepted or not, then eo 
ipso one guesses what the position of Nature could be by-
making some proper moves such as "I solved almost all the 
exercises" by (p. argue). "Then I have many points" by (D. 
infer), and "He who has many points is accepted" by (D. ex-
plain).. Whereas, if one starts telling a story about being 
a candidate and doing some test to pass an exam, and he 
states than he is accepted, his audience will not take his 
moves - if taking them correctly - to be guesses about the 
position of Nature, but rather about the position of an 
Author who may or may not be instantiated by the speaker. 
This latter fact explains away the case that virtually any-
body may re-tell the story of some author: it is not a se-
rious restriction, however, for it asserts only that there 
should be some Author or other whose moves, either silent 
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or not, are incorporated in the relevant game tree of the 
game. 
At this point we can relegate our discussion to the 
problem of identities; in an epistemological situation self-
identities are to be safeguarded by any player of the cor-
related game. The use of identical terms is warranted by the 
logical game rules. Yet, at any stage of the game the option 
of starting a new g- o may arise; e.g. when contemplating on 
the result of the test, one might wish that he had never vol-
unteered to do it. Epistemology may give way to metaphysical 
thinking at any moment. Then, we may have said he pretended 
that he did not take the exam, in which case the use of 
identical terms or variables were motivated by our residual 
claim of identity. The difference of identities is safe-
guarded by the difference of games; within one single game 
no such claim can be justified. Metaphysical games are para-
sitic on epistemic games in the same way as the use of "pre-
tends" is on negation. Hence playing the former requires the 
awareness of some of the latter kind. Yet, this information 
may not be available to every player, and so misunderstand-
ing is forthcoming; it then entails an identification of. the 
residual identity with self-identity on the basis of the use 
of self-identity being warranted all through a given game. 
Misunderstanding may come from either direction: if one 
takes a residual claim of identity for self-identity, he is 
said to be cheated into this idea, and the first Searlian 
sense of "pretends" is born. If one takes somebody's self-
identity claim to be based on a residual'identity, he is 
said to consider that person as mad, i.e. as one who mis-
conceives his own identity. Neither interpretation is how-
ever, connected with the notion of truch; for, they are 
based on how a player conceives the game he thinks he is . 
playing and the game he supposes his partners are playing. 
Yet, from the latter fact may come other misunderstandings: 
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for not only may one have lost the information of soma pre-
viously played game, but one may attribute a similar loss 
to any of his partners while he is still conscious of the 
difference. So, if one takes somebody to be such that he 
considers a residual claim of identity as based on his 
self-identity, then one is said to take that person as a 
simple disbeliever (as with the mirror case of madness, it 
would need further elaboration as the whether it should be 
assembled with it or not); if one takes somebody's self-
identity claim to be grounded in a residual identity, then ] 
one is said to take the person for said to take the person, 
for mad. It seems to be similar to the second case of mis-
understanding above, but it may turn out to be different 
if we emphasize that this time another viewpoint is being 
made: it is not belief simpliciter, rather attribution of a 
similar belief that counts. Hence, one may equally consider 
somebody to believe or not to believe the claim of miscon-
ceived identity? we have spoken about the first alternative, 
if it is the second, then one may consider the person to 
have been hypnotized in order to play off the given 
identity. 
These are all proper cases which may motiyate the use 
of "pretends". Correct or not, they can equally be represent-
' ed by corresponding game-trees which contain the relevant 
epistemic stated of the players even with respect to each 
other's thoughts. What should be emphasized, however, is 
that the fictional use of "pretends" is distinct from the 
previous in that it requires from every player that he be 
aware of having started a new game. No similar misunder^ 
standing we have delineated is welcome. This does not, in 
our opinion, disqualify the use of "pretends" in the other 
cases; it is based on the idea that the players construe 
about how the relationship of two different games should 
be viewed. And it is the possibility of such a construal, 
rather than the notion of truth, that is required. 
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9. Logical Game Rules and "Pretends" 
Elaborating further the concept of the new game we 
seem to meet with some difficulties regarding the proper 
specification of rules. The underlying idea, which motivated 
the application of logical rules in enveloping the structure 
of the dialogue, has been an adherence to truth, a conserva-
tion principle of consistency. If nature as an ideal player 
is replaced by some less omnipotent source, the whole system 
of logical game rules will be threatened. Consistency cannot 
be warranted by some application of a rule simply because 
any Author may authorize any move. He can even harbour in-
consistency. Hence, if the aim of the players is a common 
sharing of his position in the game, the inconsistency, when 
divulged, cannot be eliminated but should be admitted into . 
their epistemic alternatives. Intuitively, this means that 
everything should be allowed to be metaphisically possible. 
By what rules can such a claim be safeguarded? The proper 
answer is a serious challange to the concept of game; by 
some roundabout reasoning on how people understand fictional 
utterances we may feel entitled to propose that understand-
ing it is not a neccessary conclusion of playing, . which in 
game-theoretical terms would mean that players may happen to . 
miss the rules that the corresponding game neccessitates; 
and playing without an adequate knowledge of the rules is a 
contradiction in terms. Yet, we think that this latter is a 
non-sequitur. Examples of misrepresenting some of the rules 
of the game are abundant: the most fitting ones can be the 
apparent violations of any of the rules by some of the play-
ers, like e.g. offside in soccer, which of course result in 
punishment of the perpetrator. But it would be misplaced to 
say that he was not playing in any sense of the word. If it 
were so, then he would be simply disregarded as such and 
could not interfere with playing. The condition for his re-
maining in the game may be the fact that he can still be said 
- 405 -
to have been following the rules of the game in every re-
spect except the particular one he violated. In order to be 
disqualified his violations would have had to exceed a cer-
tain limit, the definition of which is almost always very 
arbitrary. One minor point to be noted here is that as for 
the violation of a rule, there is no difference methodolo-
gically whether the person has only misrepresented the rule, 
simply disobeyed it, or been unconscious of it. What counts 
is whether the move has been made or not. In order to be 
said to be empirically playing a game, one need-only be con-
sidered to have been observing a limited number of game 
rules. 
This general observation can be extended to language 
games as well. One may err in playing and yet not be disqual 
ified. Naturally this point is further enhanced when one's 
playing a game of fiction; for while Nature's moves always 
recall the same set of rules, which by some routine of play 
may have been adequately internalized, in a game of fiction 
the position of the Author can be instantiated by almost any 
player, and hence the corresponding moves may recall a dif-
ferent set of rules, so much so that one may be able only to 
guess at them at the outset. What makes the principle of 
playing survive, however, is that, since the means of carry-
ing off moves, i.e. uttering a set of sentences, is essen-
tially the same as in games with Nature; there is always a 
rather well-defined set of rules in the former that can have 
been internalized by playing the latter. 
The internalization of the rules of a game of fiction 
is achieved by trying to cooperate with the supposed Author 
of the game. As he can be addressed, the use of rules can be 
tested by putting to him such questions the answers to which 
will recall one of those rules. This way to obtain some idea 
of the game is, then, inherent in the aim of the players: by 
selecting proper strategies to arrive at a common agreement 
they go through a process of understanding. While sharing 
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the position of Nature meant knowledge of how things truly 
are, sharing the position of the Author here means under-
standing what he meant by putting forward his sentences. 
Games of fiction are not played in order to know the truth 
but rather to comprehend how a player conceives things to 
be. A major difficulty in completing a process like this 
resides in the fact that the moves put forward by the Author 
may often leave doubt about some implicit moves needed for 
the internalization of rules. To formulate correct topical 
questions with respect to them may turn out to be decisive 
for understanding. It would be well worth giving some ex-
amples. Works of the fantastic, paradoxical or absurd genres 
can serve us here. "Dans le labirynthe" by A". Robbe-Grillet 
provides us with a good many cases; consider one of the 
basic problems of the novel, which is also referred to by 
the title: What was the relationship between the boy and 
the soldier? Who led whom? Interpreting the Author's moves 
by putting questions, we arrive at the thought that the 
logical rule (C. cons) is no longer available; on the other 
hand, we have to make a case for the opposite rule (C. in-
cons).: contradictory moves may be admitted if both have 
been adequately explained in the game. To understand what 
is at stake here, consider the corresponding game-tree; we 
have indicated the rules we applied so that each node fol-
lowed from the one above in the tree: 
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/49/ /D. Question/ Who followed whom? 
/D.explain/ Did the soldi . the boy follow 
the boy? the soldier? 
/D.answer/ Yes. No. Yes. No. 
/D.infer/ 
/D.infer/ The boy preceded the soldier. 
The two last moves by /D.infer/ put forward by the 
Author clearly violate /C. cons/. Hence it warrants our con-
clusion. 
While /49/ Keeps the other logical game rules intact, 
we may consider another case, which makes the use of /D. 
argue/ obtrusive; we are referring to the problem whether 
the soldier finds himself in the same room at the end of 
the novel as at the beginning of it. The relevant core of 
the game-tree is the following: 
/50/ /D.question/ Where is the soldier? 
/D.explain/ Is he in the same room as before? 
/D. answer/ /D.reply/ 
/D.argue/ He finds many things 
the sa ' 
He finds some things 
different in it. 
/D.infer/ He does not* recognize it. 
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What is remarkable about /50/ is that the last move by 
/D.infer/ connects two branches, which have contradictory 
nodes higher in the tree (Yes vs No by (D.answer/). This is 
clearly different from /49/ in that it not only violates 
/C.cons/ but also conjoins contradictory moves in an infer-
ence which directly challanges the meaning of the tree. Hence 
either it is the conclusion of the inference which is un-
warranted, or it is the premises which are incorrectly put 
forward. As with /49/ we have seen that there is nothing 
wrong with /D.infer/, it must be the rule that connects the 
premises with the rest of the upper trunk of the tree, which 
has been misplaced here. Hence, we eliminate /D.argue/ by 
simply cutting the tree of /50/ at the relevant nodes into 
two. 
A last example for the internalization of rules comes 
from the play ^'Waiting for Godot" by S. Becket. We reproduce 
this time the relative passage in its entirety. 
/51/ Estragon: In my opinion we were here. 
Vladimir: (looking round) You recognizee the place? 
Estragon: I didn't say that. 
Immediately we give a game-tree for it: 
/52/ /D.ask/ Were we here or not? 
/D.answer/ 
/D.argue/ In my opinion we were here. 
/D.explain/ I recognize the place. 
/D.ask/ You recognize the place? 
/D.infer/ 




When interpreting /52/ we have two solutions: either 
we state that the Author violates /C.cons/ by putting for-
ward Estragon's two sentences, or we note the particular 
role /D.explain/ plays in the tree. But as we lack the moves 
for relegating the right branch to the highest topical ques-
tion, a respective Violation of /C.cons/ seems to be unwar-
ranted. Note here the apparent difference between /52/ and 
/49/: the condition for violating /C.cons/ can be defined 
as a condition that two contradictory answers of a polarity 
question should be put forward as a move by the'Author. As 
"No" to the highest topical question remains only a possi-
bility (in 'the lack of closure of proper branches), we can-
not assert the violation of /C.cons/. On the' other hand, we 
note that the move by /D.explain/ is almost ineffective as 
such, for, it explains nothing: from it either a positive 
or a negative answer to a polarity question can be inferred. 
The first is an implicit move, while the second is explicit. 
Hence our conclusion about the futility of /D.explain/. This 
means in other words that either nothing can be adequately 
explained because the contradictory possibility still sur-
vives, or anything can ben explained because at least one of 
the answers of a polarity question can be provided with an 
explanation. This way we have intuitively formulated a con-
dition on the futility of a rule: a rule /D.explain/ is in-
effective if it leaves open both possibilities of a polarity 
question that follows.from what should have been explained. 
By now, we can re-assume our results about games of fic-
tion in the following three conditions defined by means of 
game-trees; these three conditions are basic in the process 
of making a guess at the valid rules of the game, hence they 
are basic in understanding fiction. They attest simply how 
the use of some rules may be found invalid or not. Hence, 
they contribute to the way players must reason in order to 
make moves governed by rules which are accepted within the 
game. We state them briefly as 
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/C.E/ Whether an epistemic alternative of the Author ia 
consistent or inconsistent depends on whether two 
contradictory answers of a polarity question are put 
forward independently by him 
/C.EL/ A rule should be eliminated from the gaifle if there 
is some move governed by some other rule which can 
be inferred from two premises put forward by the 
given rule as moves that are connected to the two 
contradictory answers of a polarity question higher 
j 
up in the tree 
/C.IN/ A rule is ineffective if there is such a polarity 
question that in the event of one of its contradictory 
answers being connected with some move put:forward by 
the use of the given rule, still permits its other 
answer to be put forward 
Possibly, there are other such testing procedures. Yet we 
think it has sufficed to show that the idea of a game of 
fiction can be rationally based, and that the conclusion 
that game playing with imperfect information about some of 
the corresponding rules is out of place is really a non^ 
sequitur. An inductive test at rules not only can be level-
led at game-positions but should be referred to by the 
players of the game in order to understand the relevant 
structure of the game, viz. to guess at the previous moves, 
and hence to understand fiction as the result of the game. 
A final note on this part should be made before going 
on. By defining the aim and the rules of a game of fiction 
we have almost rounded off our argument about the game-theo-
retical treatment of fiction. No explicit foundation of 
so-called supernatural sentences should be needed; if con^ 
fronted for instance with a fable by La Fontaine, we do not 
meet any serious difficulty in correlating a game with it 
just because it may contain some sentence about animals that 
speak. Accepting a sentence as 
/53/ The ant asked the cricket why he danced so much. 
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will not amount to a violation of some rule simpliciter; 
it will only incorporate a move by the Author about ants and 
crickets to the effect that they can speak, which is game-
-theoretically trivial. It can again be shown by drawing the 
corresponding game-tree for /53/: it is important to see 
that it depends on the correct formulation of the highest 
topical question: 





From /54/ it results that the highest topical question 
of a game of fiction bears special importance: it represents 
the point of playing at which the new game we have now rep-
resented was initiated. If so, then there may have been some 
preceding move by which it was overtly expressed. This is in 
accordance with the possible use of "pretends" we proposed 
before. By some due re-consideration of the condition for 
putting forward the topical question of /54/, we can assume 
the point at which the game of /54/ was initiated to be ins-
tantiated by the following sentence: 
/55/ x pretends that someone can speak 
where x stands for the actual Author of the game. Then, on 
the basis of what we said about the use of "pretends" 'being ' 
parasitic on negation we are confronted by the next two 
possibilities: 
/56/ / E x / — /x can speak/ 
The ant asked the cricket why he danced 
so much. 
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/57/ — /Ex/ ,/x can apeak/ 
The discussion of the two forms /56/ and /57/ will be 
the topic of the chapter below; with this we close our ana-^ 
lysis of "pretends" and the game-theoretical framework pro-
posed as a possible approach. This closing topic is the 
problem of reference, to which we will be giying a dialogue 
game solution. 
10. Reference, Games, and "Pretends" 
A major merit of a game-theoretical approach to fic-
tion, we consider, is that the problem of non.-existent£, and 
hence of reference, will not arise as such. Consider for 
instance the question of there being speaking ants in the 
fable by La Fontaine; it is simply a contradiction in terms, 
for, there is no game whatsoever in which such a question 
could be put forward as a valid move. No concept of play can 
tolerate a sentence such as: 
/58/ There are speaking ants 
/58/ is either misconceived or ambiguous; if it is the lat-
ter, then it is tantamount again either to /59/ or to /60/: 
/59/ Speaking ants exist 
/60/ "There are speaking ants" can be correlated with an 
accepted move in some game of fiction 
/59/ is clearly false; for, there is no move by Nature where-
by the putting forward of /59/ could be taken to be a means 
of furthering common agreement with respect to truth, i.e. 
the position of Nature. /60/, on the other hand, is true as 
/54/ testifies it. Yet why can forms like /58/ arise? If we 
retrace our steps to the two kinds of identity, an answer 
may be forthcoming: /58/ belies the same misconception of 
identity claims as was seen to motivate the use of "pret-
ends". Though we cannot go into the different interpreta-
tions of /58/ according to which a misconception is created 
-- we have already given a similar enumeration, but we at 
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least hint at the source the dilemma of /58/ may come from; 
in order to see it, consider a transcription of /54/ with 
variables to indicate semantical structure. We also add the 
neccessary dialogue premise of /5.4/, i.e. the complement-
-sentence of /55/ as the game-initiator move. A partial dia-
logue semantical tree of /54/ is the following: 
/61/ x can speak 
Now, it should be clear that the underlying dilemma 
of /58/ is the misconception of an identity claim /x = y/ 
in the form of self-identity /x = a/. Whereas the only war-
ranted conclusion might have been something like /y = a/, 
which is, in turn, the proper interpretation of /60/. /61/, 
and hence /54/, is ambiguous: they can induce either an 
ordinary or a new dialogue game interpretation. It is /55/, 
which should be taken to be a neccessary dialogue premise of 
/54/ and /61/ in order to safeguard fictional reading; to 
avoid misconceived forms, such as /58/ a game-initiator move 
such as /55/ should be henceforth remembered. 
By now we are ready to answer the problem of choosing 
between /56/ and /57/; if our previous argument is sound, 
then to understand /54/ we have to assume /55/ as a dialogue 
premise, which is neutral to the difference of /56/ and 
/57/. It is simply irrelevant on what kind of negation the 
use of "pretends" is parasitic in particular; it will only 
become relevant if "pretends" is used merely as a proxy for 
negation (see our distinction above), i.e. if epistemology 
replaces metaphysical thinking. If dialogue games have any 
explanatory power, then it need not come as a surprise that 
Who can speak? 
If y are ants, 
y can speak 
If z are crickets, 
z can speak 
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the meaning of a sentence is not a matter per se, but. rather 
a matter of embedding it into some dialogue context or 
other. If sentences are semantically ambiguous, they must 
induce various contextual analyses. Since reference is part 
and parcel of semantics, it is, in our opinion natural that 
an ambiguity like the real/fictional, boils down to the con-
struction of different dialogue game contexts between which 
no direct inferential relation need be adequately based. The 
use of fiction is justified as long as the information of 
playing a separate game is kept alive. 
11. To Sum up 
In this paper we have attempted to give a detailed 
treatment of the word "pretends" and its semantical charac-
ter. We stated that its ordinary uses give rise to a neat 
distinction of identity claims, and sought -for a possible 
coherent formulation of the ambiguities attested. We hinted 
at the inadequacy of the classical framework and proposed a 
game-theoretical solution. In outlining the corresponding 
theory, we touched upon some related phenomena as logical 
structure, reference and real/fictional ambiguity and ar-
gued that they can be accomodated in dialogue game con«* 
struction in a very natural way. We think finally that a 
game-theoretical analysis of fiction can be considered as 
further evidence of the utility of introducing the concept 
of game into the field of the humanities, besides the al^ 
ready available approaches, Hintikka's semantical and Carl-
son's dialogue game theories. 
- 415 -
Notes 
1 Cf. for instance Searle (1974), Pavel (1981), Lieb (1981). 
2 
Saarinen (1982a) makes a similar claim with respect to 
reference simpliciter; his approach encouraged our dis-
tinction, though we will argue that it is a distinction . 
in the way how identities are viewed. 
3 Searle (.1974); also in Searle (1979) p. 65. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Lakoff (.1970) ch. V. 
6 Cf. Searle (.1979) p. 7. 
7 
See note 3. 
8 Cf. Karttunen (1974). 
9 Cf. Partee (.1975). 
1 0 It is Partee herself who brings up an argument by Casta-
ñeda; for the latter, see for instance Castañeda (1968). 
1 1 In: Saarinen (.1982c) pp. 1-69. See p. 47. 
1 2 
This example is taken from a short satirical piece by a 
fairly well-known Hungarian author, F. Karinthy: Science, 
What is at stake here, in other words, is that John may 
think that he is identical with, say, de Sade, who, in 
turn, is mad, without forcing us into a circle of reasons 
ing on John's madness. 
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14 The following remark may be in order here: as our ana-
lysis is biased by the concept of identity, this argument 
cannot be connected directly with an approach based on 
coreference like e.g. that in' Hintikka-Carlson (1977). 
Coreference can be realized by either kind of identity: 
in game-theoretical semantics it is expressed by the fact 
that the same set of rules is used in each case. What is 
at stake here is a distinction in the rules that support 
the différent identity claims (see especially when our 
game-theoretical framework is put forward). Our restric-
tions then may be looked upon as a restriction on the 
uses of variables rather then on the individuals they 
refer or corefer to. Laziness is a matter of indépendant 
substitution of the same term into different variables 
- hence giving way to some, say, residual claim of iden-
tity /x = y/ because there may be terms for which a si-
milar process is not valid, whereas in Hintikka-Carlson 
(1977) the question of a pronoun's being lazy or not dep-
ends on its corefering with one term or other, hence in 
each case a claim of self-identity with respect to the 
coreferred individual applies. 
15 
In what follows we constructively apply Carlson's dialogue 
game treatment to the problems of "pretends" and of fic-
tion. For lack of space we cannot reproduce his arguments 
in detail, neither can we repeat his definitions of game 
rules. Yet, we do not think that a complete acquaintance 
with his work should be neccessary in order to understand 
the basic claims of our paper. 
1 6 Cf. Carlson (.1983) p. 11. 
1 7 We use the Faber paperback edition of Becket's play; Sa-
muel Becket: Waiting for Godot, Faber and Faber, 1956, 
London, p. 15. 
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